


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
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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

26 April 1962

## DAILY BRIEF

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USSR: The changes in the top Soviet leadership made at the plenum of the central committee during the 23-25 April Supreme Soviet session reverses action taken at the 22nd party congress last October. The return of Andrey Kirilenko to the party presidium and the dropping of Ivan Spiridonov from the secretariat suggests political maneuvering between representatives of the Ukrainian and Leningrad party organizations. No shift in Soviet national policies is indicated; Kirilenko and Spiridonov are not known to be associated with specific policy positions.

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Cuba: Fidel Castro's 25 April public affirmation that certain revolutionary goals could not be attained until serious economic difficulties were resolved is another in the series of recent remarks by Cuban leaders criticizing the regime's poor performances thus far in the economic field. Such criticism has been unusually frank in finding fault with both the regime's "unrealistic" economic planning and its ineptness in handling administrative detail. The Castro regime appears to be responding to recent complaints from dissatisfied groups who can no longer be convinced that present shortages and privations are due entirely to US "imperialism" and whose continued co-operation and sacrifice are necessary if there is to be economic improvement. Castro's statement may foreshadow further reshuffling of top-level planners and administrators in an effort to reduce public disaffection in the next year or two before increased experience and bloc-supported projects could begin to produce an upturn in the economy.

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Congo: Although both Adoula and Tshombé have indicated their willingness to resume reunification negotiations, each has publicly questioned the other's good faith, and no new talks appear likely before early May. In a statement on 24 April, Tshombé stated that he was prepared to return to Leopoldville to join with "those who work for the reconstruction of the Congo." He expressed doubt, however, whether Adoula and Interior Minister Kamitatu were such men. Tshombé criticized US support of the central government, and contended enigmatically that continued US support for the Adoula government "will lead to many surprises."

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[Tshombé's hint that he could work more amicably with someone other than Adoula may be designed to exploit anti-Adoula sentiment in Leopoldville in the hope of bringing down the Adoula government. Although parliament remains generally responsible to the Premier, there is widespread dissatisfaction in Leopoldville]

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with the failure of the negotiations to date. The Congolese Army continues restive over the stalemated negotiations

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Portugal: Government and security officials reportedly are concerned over agitation planned by the Portuguese Communist party for 1 May. Lisbon University students, who were on strike prior to spring vacation which began in mid-April, are expected to resume their strike and to support Communist-planned demonstrations in Lisbon. Strikes of industrial workers are planned in other cities, particularly in Oporto, long a center of opposition to the Salazar dictatorship.

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The Ministry of Corporations has announced that "sanctions" will be taken against workers who stop work or employers who authorize stoppages.

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\*Argentina: President Guido scheduled the election of president and vice president for 27 October 1963 and anulled the recent election of federal deputies, after the Chamber of Deputies

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on 25 April still refused to act on the Peronista problem and enact electoral reforms. These decrees--which imply interim rule by executive decree--will increase the possibility of disturbances and sharpen attacks on the thin line of constitutionality he has been trying to maintain. The Chamber of Deputies has the constitutional right to determine the acceptability of elected deputies and was to have met today on this subject. On the other hand, the state of siege, which has been in effect since November 1958, suspends constitutional guarantees and enables the president to rule by decree. The timing of the elections has also provoked strong disagreement among Argentine experts, some claiming elections must be held in 90 days, the clearly specified minimum limit. Guido said that the elected officials would take office on 1 May 1964, the scheduled end of ex-President Frondizi's term.

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Numerous Peronista offices have been closed since the federal government took control of the provinces on 24 April. Air force leaders are reported worried over whether the government is sufficiently unified to deal with disturbances, in view of the army showdown on 21 April and the subsequent navy communiqué which repeated strong demands on Guido.

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## WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United States Intelligence Board concludes that:

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No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action in the immediate future.

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## NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

The United States Intelligence Board, on 25 April 1962, approved the following national intelligence estimate:

NIE 13-2-62 "Chinese Communist Advanced Weapons Capabilities," 25 April 1962

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Advance conclusions are normally distributed within 24 hours of approval, and the printed text within five days.


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DAILY BRIEF

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### Soviet Party Plenum

Kirilenko, a product of the Ukrainian party organization, had been a candidate member of the party presidium since the ouster of Molotov, Malenkov, and others in 1957, but was dropped at the 22nd party congress last fall. At that time, Spiridonov, the increasingly prominent Leningrad party boss, was added to the secretariat. The reasons behind Kirilenko's demotion last fall are still obscure; he had been one of Khrushchev's strong supporters, and following the congress was retained in his provincial post as Sverdlovsk party boss.

Spiridonov's election last Monday as chairman of one of the houses of the bicameral Supreme Soviet was given by TASS as the reason for his relief from the secretariat. However, the Supreme Soviet post has been a minor part-time position without political significance, and past incumbents have retained their other jobs in party or government. Spiridonov may have been held responsible for industrial deficiencies recently charged against the Leningrad party organization in the journal Party Life. He has long been considered a protégé of Frol Kozlov, second-ranking man on the party secretariat. While Spiridonov's demotion could indicate a weakening of Kozlov's position as Khrushchev's heir apparent, there have been no other signs that Kozlov's status was in any way impaired.

The TASS announcement did not elaborate on any questions of policy discussed at the plenum.

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### Cuban "Self-Criticism" in the Economic Field

Choosing a nationally televised round-table discussion on Cuba's state-run "children's centers" as his forum, Castro went further than he has in the past in admitting his regime's economic shortcomings. He said that plans to build additional centers to care for the children of working mothers would have to be based on "economic reality." Such reality, he went on, includes recognition that the Cuban economy is weak, underdeveloped, and still based primarily on a single crop; that Cuban industrial facilities are "old;" that "a country cannot spend more than it produces, that people cannot demand what does not exist." He characterized the country's wage system as "chaotic" and said that some were earning too much and others too little.

Among other recent critics of the Castro regime's economic practices was Minister of Industries Che Guevara, who on 16 March denounced what he termed "an absurd plan completely divorced from reality with absurd targets and supply assumptions straight from a dream world." On 16 April Guevara recognized in another speech that wage levels were unjust and said that a wage classification system, based on the value of the individual worker's production, would be established. He added, however, that no worker's present wages would be reduced in the classification scheme, which would take effect as positions were vacated. Dissatisfaction with wages has been partly responsible for slowdowns and absenteeism in important sectors of the economy; professional sugar-cane cutters reportedly have been disgruntled by the higher wages given to "volunteer" cutters, and their resentment has played a part in the lag in this year's sugar production.

Other speakers have adopted the Marxist principle of "criticism and self-criticism" in attacking inefficiency, an overabundance of bureaucratic controls, shoddy quality, inaccurate economic reporting, and other deficiencies in the management of the Cuban economy. Their remarks reveal concern lest continuing

difficulties lead to an increase in popular disaffection and to a steady decline in Cuba's international economic position.

Sino-Soviet bloc economic assistance to Cuba for the most part has been programmed on a long-range basis that is not expected to show appreciable results until 1963 at the earliest. The bloc is increasing shipments of foodstuffs and other consumer goods in short supply, but no substantial gains for consumers appear attainable in the near future.

In addition to indulging in a recitation of its own economic errors, the Castro regime can be expected to continue attempts to increase revolutionary fervor by staging mass rallies and other dramatic evidences of revolutionary solidarity. The celebration of May Day, featuring a massive parade by Cuban workers and the presence mostly at Cuba's expense of more than 100 special delegates from some 40 countries, is expected to furnish such an occasion. [redacted]

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The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

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The Deputy Secretary of Defense

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The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

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Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

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The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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